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Abstract: 
We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical 
individual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric and 
concave social welfare function.  Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles (Econ. 
Letters, 57: 289-296; 1997) have shown that maximization of social welfare precludes income 
equality in this setting.  We show that their case breaks down when the public good is impure: there 
exist individual preferences under which maximization of social welfare necessitates exact income 
equalization.  Even if the public good is pure, any given, positive level of income inequality can be 
shown to be socially excessive by suitably specifying individual preferences.  Thus, sans knowledge 
of individual preferences, one cannot reject the claim that a marginal redistribution from the rich to 
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 1.  Introduction 
Rich individuals often voluntarily contribute towards the provision of public goods that are 
intrinsically important for the well-being of the poor, but have negligible impact on their incomes.  
Examples of such public goods that routinely acquire rich patrons include places of worship, ethnic 
festivals, literary and cultural activities, sports clubs, civic/neighborhood amenities (including parks, 
museums, theatres, community halls, libraries), scientific research, etc.  A large literature exists on 
voluntary provision of public goods with negligible income consequences.  This literature typically 
examines how redistribution of income might influence the equilibrium level of voluntary provision.
1  
A related issue, which has received much less attention, is how voluntary provision affects the 
normative case for income equalization.  Given identical individual preferences, represented by some 
indirect utility function that is strictly concave in income, maximization of any social welfare function 
that is symmetric and concave in utilities requires income equalization when all consumption is 
private.  Would voluntary public goods provision by the rich suffice to negate this conclusion? 
In a well-known contribution, Itaya et al. (1997) argued that this is indeed the case.  Examining 
the Nash equilibrium of a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a pure public good, 
they showed that maximization of social welfare necessarily implies inequality in incomes.
2  In light 
of this finding, however, two additional questions immediately suggest themselves.   
First, while Itaya et al. (1997) focused on ‘pure’ public goods, where individual contributions are 
perfect substitutes, public goods in reality are often better conceptualized as ‘impure’.  Individuals 
may derive greater utility from an additional unit of the public good if they themselves provide it, 
because of the ‘warm glow’ from the act of giving per se, or due to other private benefits.
3  Does 
maximization of social welfare preclude equalization of income when public goods are impure? 
Second, even in the empirically restrictive case of pure public goods, does social optimality 
impose a positive lower bound on inequality, regardless of individual preferences?  If not, any 
arbitrary level of inequality, however small, could be deemed socially excessive under some 
configuration of individual preferences.  Thus, it would not be possible to reject greater equalization 
independently of individual preferences, even if inequality is arbitrarily small in the status quo.  While 
Itaya et al. (1997) reject exact equalization independently of individual preferences, they remain silent 
on this issue of ‘virtual’, or ‘almost exact’, equalization.  Yet, reducing inequality to arbitrarily small 
levels appears to be of more substantive interest than the limiting construct of exact equalization.   
The purpose of this paper is to answer these two questions.  As in Itaya et al. (1997), we consider 
a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical individual 
                                                 
1  See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007, 2005), Cornes and Sandler (2000, 1996), Bergstrom et al. (1986), etc.    
2  A related contribution is Cornes and Sandler (2000), who show that redistribution from the poor to the rich 
can be Pareto-improving in certain contexts.  However, unlike Itaya et al. (1997), theirs is not a general defence 
of inequality.  For example, no inequality expanding redistribution is Pareto-improving in a two-person society. 
3  See, for example, Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007), Cornes and Sandler (1994) and Andreoni (1990).  The pure 
public good model implies any income redistribution that leaves the set of contributors unchanged will have no 
impact on equilibrium consumption bundles: a hypothesis that is typically rejected in empirical investigations. 
  1preferences, and examine equilibrium social welfare under a separable, symmetric and concave social 
welfare function.  We show that, when the public good is impure, there exist individual preferences 
under which maximization of social welfare entails exact equalization of income.  Thus, the case that 
Itaya et al. (1997) make against equality turns out to be vulnerable in the presence of private benefits 
from giving.  Furthermore, when the public good is pure, any given level of income inequality can be 
deemed socially excessive by suitably specifying individual preferences.  Our results imply that 
voluntary provision of public goods, by itself, does not necessitate income inequality as a 
precondition for the maximization of social welfare.  Indeed, there exist preference configurations 
which make equality socially essential under such voluntary provision.  Furthermore, sans knowledge 
of individual preferences, one cannot dismiss the claim that a marginal redistribution from the rich to 
the poor will improve social welfare, regardless of how small inequality is in the status quo.   
Section 2 sets up the model; Section 3 presents our results.  Proofs are provided in the Appendix. 
 
2.  The model 
Consider a two person society,
4 where preferences are given by: 
() i i i i y y x u u − + = η , ; 
i x , ,  denoting, respectively, private consumption by individual  i y i y− { } 2 , 1 ∈ i , the amount of the 
public good provided by i,  and the amount provided by the other person;  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ η .  Thus, 
individuals have identical preferences.  The public good is pure in the special case where  1 = η ; it is 
impure in the remaining cases  ( 1 , 0 ∈ ) η .  Both prices are set equal to unity for notational simplicity; 
total income in society is normalized to one.  Let   denote the income of individual i; so that 
.  The two individuals play a standard Cournot game of voluntary contributions to the 
public good, as in Itaya et al. (1997).  Thus, for individual 
0 > i I
i I − i I− =1
{ } 2 , 1 ∈ i , the optimization problem is: 
  () i i i
y x




 subject to: 
  ;  i i i I y x = +
  .  0 , ≥ i i y x
Denoting the Nash equilibrium utility levels by  , aggregate welfare in equilibrium is given by 
some social welfare function that is symmetric, separable and concave in individual utilities: 
∗ ∗
2 1 ,u u
  ( ) ( )
*
2 1 u g u g W + =
∗ ; 
where  .  Since equilibrium utilities depend on the income distribution, so does social 
welfare.  Income redistribution affects social welfare by changing individual utilities in equilibrium.   
0 , 0 < ′ ′ > ′ g g
                                                 
4  Our analysis can be easily generalized to more than two individuals, without altering our conclusions. 
  2 
3.  Results 
Does maximization of social welfare necessarily rule out income equality?  Lacking knowledge of 
individual preferences, can one identify some positive magnitude of inequality in the status quo as 
socially inadequate, in that a marginal rise in inequality will necessarily improve social welfare?  We 
now proceed to answer these questions. 
 
Proposition 1.  Suppose the public good is impure ( ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ η ).  Then there exist utility functions 
under which maximization of social welfare necessitates income equalization. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
  Proposition 1 implies that, given any symmetric, separable and concave social welfare 
function, voluntary provision of public goods does not, by itself, negate the case for income 
equalization.  Indeed, maximization of social welfare may necessitate exact equality, even though 
greater inequality elicits greater public good contribution from the rich.  There do exist cases where 
maximization of social welfare precludes exact equality, but, unless the public good is pure, there can 
be no a priori presumption that this will indeed be so, irrespective of individual preferences. 
  As Itaya et al. (1997) have shown, such a presumption, independent of individual preferences, 
is valid when the public good is pure.  Nevertheless, even in this case, no amount of wealth inequality, 
however small, can be presumed to be socially optimal or inadequate, irrespective of individual 
preferences.  This is so because any given magnitude of wealth inequality is socially excessive under 
particular preference configurations.  Thus, without knowledge of individual preferences, one cannot 
dismiss the claim that a marginal redistribution from the rich to the poor will improve social welfare, 
regardless of how small inequality is in the status quo.  We conclude by formally stating this result.   
 
Proposition 2.  Suppose the public good is pure ( 1 = η ).  Then, given any unequal income 
distribution, there exist utility functions that imply a marginal redistribution from the rich to the poor 
will improve social welfare. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
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, 0 η , 
+ + ℜ ∈ λ . Without loss of generality, suppose 
2
1
1 < ≡θ I .  Consider any social welfare function: 
;  () () 2 u g + 1 u g W = 0 ; 0 ≤ ′ ′ > ′ g g .  Two cases are possible.   
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∗ ∗ ∗ < 2 1 u u ( ) ( )
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Now, [ ( ) ( ) λ + θ θ λ − − + ≡
∗ 1 ln ln ln 1 u
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y ]  Solving, we get: 
() ()
()








∗ y  and  () ( )
()








∗ y .  Thus,  , implying (since 
∗ ∗ > 1 2 y y 1 < η ); 
.  Noting that, for all  ] [ ] [ 2 1 1 2
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ + > + y y y y η η { } 2 , 1 ∈ i , [ ( )
∗
−
∗ + i i y y η
∗ = i x λ ], we thus get  , 
and, therefore,  , implying 
∗ ∗ > 1 2 x x
∗ > 1 u
∗
2 u ( ) ( )
∗ ′ ≤ 1 u g
∗ + ≡ i i I r
∗ ′ 2 u g
)
.  Notice now that 
[ ], where  .  Using the solutions for 
individual contributions, we get: 
() λ λ + + =























































 ,   and [












].  As  , we have   















.  Recalling  ( ) ( )
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  4Proof of Proposition 2.  Let preferences be given by:  () i i i i y y x u − + + = ln ln λ ;  + + ℜ ∈ λ .  
Without loss of generality, suppose 
2
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Notice now that   iff 
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.  Hence,   and thus  .  Consider any social welfare function: 
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